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INTRODUCTION
Defendant-Appellant William Clifford Bartley
("Bartley") presents this reply brief to address matters raised
in the Brief of Respondent dated May 30, 1989, and in the
Supplemental Authorities submitted by the State on June 1, 1989.
The State, in the Supplemental Authorities, raises an issue of
constitutional dimension which should be considered as a matter
of fairness and justice to Bartley.

That issue is whether

Bartley's constitutional right against self incrimination was
violated when the Court permitted cross examination of Bartley*s
codefendant, Jay Charles Wade, about the post arrest silence of
both defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State has accurately set forth the facts in its
Statement of Facts, with the following exceptions:
1.

The State's description of the stop of the

defendants implies that the sheriff and his deputy smelled the
drip gas before the stop occurred.

It is clear from the

transcript that they smelled nothing until after the arrest.
Motion Tr. at 11:
Q. (Counsel for Wade) When the vehicle that was
driven by Mr. Wade approached, where were you
parked? What did you observe about that vehicle?
A. (Sheriff Wright) It was towing a tank on a
trailer, and it was lugged down and going very
slowly.
Q.

You didn't notice anything else about it?
2

A.
I was standing to one side of it. I told him
to go to the police car. I noticed a smell later.
That was a crude oil smell. Meanwhile, the other
vehicles were coming down towards me, I thought.
Motion Tr. at 28:
Q.
(Counsel for Wade) You observed the clear
liquid after you placed these men under arrest; is
that right?
A.

(Sheriff Wright)

I think that's when it was.

Trial Tr. I at 67-68:
Q.
(Prosecutor during direct examination.)
you place the individuals in custody?
A.

Did

(Sheriff Wright) Yes.

Q.
And you placed them—Did you do something to
secure them, their persons?
A.

I believe they were handcuffed, yes.

Q,

And placed in the patrol car?

A.

Yes.

Kirby did that.

Q.
Did you have occasion to observe or go back
and look at these tanks and trucks?
A.
Right then I just walked along and slapped
them. But then I said, "You better get the hell
down here. The other outfit is trying to get away
from us, and we better head them off down by
Perkins Ranch." We were three minutes behind them
at that time and probably going south, and we hadQ.
During that period of time, did you observe
anything with regard to those materials or
anything in regard to those vehicles and tanks?
A.
I had the impression they weren't all full.
There was what I would associate a smell with
them, and we also had that smell in the car when
we put those people in there.
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Q.
Can you identify or tell us what kind of
smell it was?
A.
It's a rank odor that I associate with crude
oil or drip gas or the oil well base product.
Trial Tr. II at 131:
Q. (Prosecutor during direct examination.) Did
you have occasion to inspect or see or observe
anything with regard to the contents of the tanks?
A.
(Deputy Kirby) In the bank of Mr. Wadefs
pickup there was a tank. On the trailer he was
pulling was three tanks. I believe it was the
first tank—was approximately half-full. And I
opened the valve on it.
Q.

This is at the time of the stop?

A.
This is a little bit later. This is after
Mr.—I believe after Mr. Bartley was arrested. We
started to kind of looking the vehicles over.
Q.
That's what I was wondering.
the valve, what did you observe?
A.

When you opened

There was a liquid came out.

Q.
Can you tell us anything you remember of what
you remember about the liquid?
A.
It stunk.
butane.
2.

It reminded me of propane, of

The State describes the area in which Bartley was

driving as an oil field.

Bartley was driving on a road that runs

from Dove Creek, Colorado, to Montezuma Creek, Utah, intersecting
with a road from Blanding, Utah.
an oil well.

This was not a dead-end road to

The road serves farms, ranches, the Navajo

Reservation, and the oil field.
3.

(Trial Tr. I at 58-59).

The State says that the state criminologist
4

compared samples of the liquid on Bartley's clothes with a sample
of drip gas from the Wintershall tank and found them comparable.
What the criminologist actually compared were the residues from
the Wintershall tank after all volatile substances had evaporated
and the residue from a stain extracted from Bartleyfs clothes
with a solvent.
Trial Tr. II at 235:
Q.
You're not actually comparing what was
originally on the jacket or in the bottle?
A.
No. No. It would be much too involved.
wouldn't expect to find it there.
4.

I

The State also does not mention that the state

criminologist received a sample from the Wintershall tank from
which the material "had volatilized" (Trial Tr. II at 234) and in
which there was nothing to be compared.

(Trial Tr. II at 234).

No explanation was ever offered as to why the first sample, from
which everything had volatilized, had no residue to compare,
while there was a residue from the second sample.
The State accurately cites the record in its
Supplemental Authorities filed on June 1, 1989, with respect to
the State's cross examination of Wade about his post arrest
silence.

Bartley adds the following facts concerning that

testimony:
1.

Wade did not testify during direct examination

m a t ne had not been given an opportunity before or after his
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arrest to explain what he had been doing.
2.

Wade's testimony about any statements to the

sheriff and his deputy was consistent with their testimony about
those statements (Trial Tr. I at 78, Trial Tr. IV at 350).
3.

Wade was Bartleyfs only witness as to what they

had been doing that night.
ARGUMENT
I.
THAT DEFENDANTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN STOPPED
WITHOUT A ROADBLOCK DOES NOT VALIDATE THE STOP.
The State appears to concede that the sheriff and his
deputy did set up a roadblock on the night in question.

It then

passes off Bartley's roadblock argument by claiming that Bartley
could have been stopped anyway based on a reasonable suspicion.
There is no evidence that the sheriff actually had a
reasonable suspicion.

There is also no evidence that Bartley

would or could have been stopped without a roadblock.
Furthermore, if Bartley is not permitted to challenge the
sheriff's illegal roadblock, it is likely that no one else will.
If the State's argument is accepted, police will be virtually
free to set up roadblocks at will.

Those not arrested will not

challenge the roadblocks and the police will almost always
succeed in constructing, after the fact, a reasonable suspicion
to justify their actions.
II. THERE WAS NEITHER REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR
THE STOP NOR PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST.
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When the sheriff stopped Bartley, he knew 1) that there
had been thefts of drip gas from tanks in the area and 2) that it
was late at night.

Those facts cannot justify a stop.

Baumgartel, 762 P.2d 2 (Utah App. 1988).

State v.

In an area of farms and

ranches, the presence of "farm size" tanks on pickups and
trailers suggests no illegal activity.

Bartley was not driving

on a dead end road leading to an oil well.

He was driving on a

major county road serving farms, ranches, the Navajo Reservation,
and oil fields.
Even accepting, which Bartley does not, the idea that
the presence of tanks on the pickups and trailers added an
additional element sufficient to generate reasonable suspicion,
not even the State contends that the sheriff had probable cause
until after the discovery of drip gas in the tanks.

However, the

record is clear that this discovery occurred only after the
arrest.

It therefore cannot be used to justify the arrest.

State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988) (evidence gained
after stop cannot be used to justify stop).
III. BARTLEY WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
To its credit, the State has raised an issue that,
though raised by Bartley at trial, was not raised by Bartley in
his docketing statement or appeal brief.

That issue has a

constitutional dimension, and the State concedes that it should
be addressed at this time.
7

The State obtained, without objection, the testimony of
Sheriff Wright that neither Bartley nor Wade had made any
statements at the time of arrest, except that they knew of no
third vehicle (Trial Tr. I at 78). That testimony was given
early in the trial, with little emphasis to impress it in the
jurors1 minds.

However, during cross examination of Wade, the

State interrogated him over objection from counsel for Bartley
and Wade, concerning his post arrest silence (Trial Tr. IV at
349-353).

That interrogation was lengthy and the prosecutor's

mostly rhetorical questions clearly implied that Wade and Bartley
said nothing to explain their actions because they either had not
yet worked out a believable story or knew their story would not
check out.
The trial court approved this interrogation on the
grounds that Wade had waived his right against self incrimination
by taking the stand.

That ruling was clearly error.

Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).

Doyle v.

It is also clear from the transcript

that this cross examination was devastating to both defendants.
Although Bartleyfs right against self incrimination was
not directly violated by this interrogation, his right was
nevertheless clearly affected.

Wade was his witness.

Wade was

also his codefendant and the clear implications in the
prosecutor's questions were as applicable to Bartley as to Wade.
The questions were as much a comment on Bartleyfs post arrest
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silence as on Wadefs.

Furthermore, the treatment of Wade by the

Court and the prosecutor was an important factor in the decision
of Bartley not to testify in his own defense.
The State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that this
error was harmless.
That it cannot do.

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987).
Wade and Bartley were prepared to present

believable versions of the events of that night.
explanation was not fanciful or imaginary.

Their

They were cut short

when the prosecutor's treatment of Wade seriously compromised him
as a witness and dissuaded Bartley from even taking the stand.
Were it not for this erroneous ruling by the trial court, there
is a real possibility that the defendants would have been able to
generate a reasonable doubt in the jurors1 minds.
This is not a case where comment on post arrest silence
was necessary to clarify discrepancies regarding defendants1
opportunity to provide information to the authorities.
v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373 (Utah 1982).

See State

That opportunity was not

an issue in this case.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY
RULINGS WERE PREJUDICIAL.
The State asserts that Bartley's possession of a gun
was somehow relevant to the circumstances of the crime and
arrest.

It cites State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977),

where the rape was so closely tied into the picture of the crime
and the defendant's motive for murder as to be inseparable.
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The

State then offers no explanation of how Bartley's possession of a
hand gun in any way related to the theft.
The State justifies admission of evidence concerning
disappearance of the vehicles and tanks to explain the absence of
evidence.

It cites no authority for the proposition that the

State is entitled to explain why its evidence is sparse.

If the

State is correct that there was ample other evidence of guilt,
there was no need to explain.

The jury is entitled to hear all

evidence that is admissible, but there is no need to explain
every absence of evidence, particularly when the explanation
carries prejudicial overtones.
Evidence of the commission of other crimes must be used
tfith extreme caution.
1984).

State v. Holder, 699 P.2d 583 at 584 (Utah

In this case the prosecutor and the trial court threw

caution to the wind.

The cumulative effect of this evidence was

to portray Bartley as a "bad actor."

After the State's

determined efforts to introduce this evidence, it cannot now be
permitted to say that the evidence was not important.
. V. THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE APPROPRIATENESS
OF APPOINTING OTHER COUNSEL TO REPRESENT BARTLEY.
Counsel for Bartley was appointed little more than a
nonth before the trial.

Though he believes his preparation for

trial was adequate, the record shows that his performance at
trial was not perfect.

He failed to object initially to

testimony of Bartley's post arrest silence (Trial Tr. I at 78).
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His failure to file a motion in limine with respect to the
introduction of evidence about Bartley's possession of a hand gun
and the disappearance of the vehicles and tanks meant the jurors
would hear all objections (Trial Tr. I at 66, 78-82).

The

consequence of this is that the objections may have served only
to focus the jury's attention on those matters.

He failed to

initially address on appeal the trial court's clearly erroneous
ruling permitting cross examination of Wade concerning his post
arrest silence.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, counsel for
Bartley was involved in Bartley's decision not to take the stand.
That decision was affected 1) by the treatment given Wade by the
prosecutor and the Court during his cross examination, and 2) by
the belief of Bartley's counsel that evidence of Bartley's prior
felony theft conviction, though ostensibly introduced to impeach
his credibility, would inevitably lead the jury to conclude that
Bartley is a thief,
Bartley has already addressed the first reason for that
decision.

With respect to the second reason, it has now become

clear that Bartley's present counsel did not correctly understand
the law.

Although the Utah Supreme Court had stated that theft

obviously implies dishonesty under the old rules of evidence,
State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 at 34 (Utah 1984), this Court has
since ruled that robbery, State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App.
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1988) and theft, State v. Brown, 105 U.A.R. 25 (Utah App. 1989)
are not necessarily crimes of dishonesty under the new rules of
evidence, and will not necessarily be admissible for impeachment
purposes.
While Bartley!s present counsel believes his
representation of Bartley has been adequate, though not
brilliant, it is appropriate that this Court consider appointing
other counsel to address the adequacy of Bartley!s
representation.
CONCLUSION
Bartleyfs conviction should be reversed.

The Court

should also consider whether other counsel should be appointed
for Bartley to address the adequacy of his representation by
present counsel.
DATED this ZIV-xddiY of June, 1989.

^f^/L 4y/^
Lyl^/R.^Anderson
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
William Clifford Bartley
P. 0. Box 275
Monticello, Utah 84535
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